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CHAPTER I 
MATRIMONIUM 
Marriage among the Romans could occur at quite an 
early age, according to modern standards. Bethrothal might 
be arranged at any age above seven. 1 The custom of early 
bethrothal and marriage certainly tended to discourage any 
romantic inclinations. If one did marry for love, general-
ly it was with a widow or divorcee. The possibility of sen-
timental attachment among the very young was slight, but 
marriage to the Romans was not for love, but for duty to 
the state. Often the Romans had to rely on a post-marital 
propinquity for the development of love which normally pre-
cedes marriage. Seneca advises a wise man to 
love his wife with the head, not 
with the heart, [for] . . . noth-
ing is more hateful than to love 
one's wife as one loves one's mis-
tress. 2 
Lucre was of ten another important reason for the 
Romans to marry. Generally girls without fortun~,but never-
theless beautiful, had a hard time securing a husband. Yet 
the lot of a suitor who made a rich marriage was not al-
ways a happy one. The wife had much control over her hus-
band, for he could not alienate any of the dowry or contract 
2 
away any without the wife's consent. He was thus a slave 
to his wife's fortune. "Si illa tibi placet, placenda dos 
quoque est quam dat tibi. Postremo quod vis non duces, nisi 
illud quod non vis feres. 113 In reference to this same idea 
Juvenal said " •.. Optima set quare Censennia teste marito 
bis quingena dedit: tanti vocat ille pudicam. 114 
Procreation was another important reason for the 
Romans to marry. In fact, the government offered very lucra-
tive incentives to encourage procreation, because more child-
ren meant more Roman citizens and if male children then more 
soldiers. If a person were married but childless he was 
forbidden to receive more than one-half his legacy unless 
the testator stood within the sixth degree. 5 A man escaped 
penalty if he had one child, a free woman if she had three 
and a freed woman if she had four. If a wife were child-
less she could only claim a tenth of that part of the hus-
band's will that he assigned to her. Mothers of three or 
four children were also entitled to freedom from tutela -
guardianship over herself and her property. Persons with 
children were also exempt from various disagreeable civil 
duties. Candidates for public office were given preference 
according to their number of children. 6 
For all of these reasons, marriage was greatly en-
couraged among the Romans. Augustus also encouraged marri-
age through additional legislation. It was decreed that if 
men were not married by the age of 25 and women_ by 20 they 
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were to be penalized. The laws favored the married and dis-
favored the celibate. Celibates were forbidden to receive 
legacies unless they were related to the testator in at 
least the sixth degree. There were however a few excep-
tions. They could receive the legacy if they married with-
in 100 days or if an engagement was made to marry and exe-
cuted within a two year period. Widows were exempt for two 
years and divorcees for eighteen months before they were 
pressured to remarry. Tiberius said that when a man reached 
sixty and a woman fifty they were to be considered celi-
bates for life if they were unrnarried. 7 These penalties 
for celibacy and childlessness endured for centuries until 
they were abolished by Constantine and later Christian 
emperors, for Christian law did not favor remarriage, al-
though it was not prohibited. 8 
Sponsalia 
Roman marriages generally were preceded by betro-
thal or engagement, which was a reciprocal promise between 
the intending husband or father and the girl's father or 
guardian. The consent of the woman (girl) was unnecessary, 
especially if she was under her father's power, and too it 
was considered improper for a young woman to promise her-
self. She was always given by the paterfamilias, or in the 
case of no paterfamilias, she was given by one of her rel-
atives. Betrothal promises took the form of sponsio,and 
originally the contract was enforceable if either party 
4 
reneged on the engagement agreement. Most likely this ac-
tion ceased long before the end of the Republic, for the 
Romans felt it was immoral to allow an action for a breach 
of promise to marry. Betrothal became just an informal a-
greement to marry. Made in writing and before witnesses, 
the agreement was easily renounced by either party with the 
formula condicione tua non utor. 9 The betrothal gifts gen-
erally were not of enough significance to warrant proceed-
ings for restoration. 
The betrothal agreement, however, did place restric-
tions on an individual. Sexual intercourse with another 
man made the engaged girl actionable for adultery, and from 
the moment of betrothal the relatives of the pair had the 
status of in-laws. 10 A man was liable for infamia if he 
were concurrently a party in two different engagements. 11 
Through Christianity, the law concerning betrothal was 
changed and by the fourth century A.D. the fiancee gave the 
girl a gift, arra sponsalicia, to guarantee betrothal. If 
he did not marry her he gave up claim to the gift, and if 
she refused to marry him she had to return fourfold, later 
double, the monetary value of the gift. 12 
Matrimonii Impedimenta 
Betrothal did not guarantee one the right to marry, 
for there were certain restrictions and requirements per-
taining to a Roman marriage. In order to have iustae 
nuptiae or iustum matrimonium the parties must have conubium, 
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the right to enter into a true marriage. The right of 
conubium was possessed by all Roman citizens and certain 
others to whom the government might grant the privilege. 
Iustum matrimonium est, si inter 
eos, qui nuptias contrahunt, con-
ubium sit, et tam masculus pubes 
quam femina potens sit, et utrique 
consentiant, si sui iuris sint, 
aut etiam parentis eorum, si in 
potestate sunt. Conubium est 
uxoris iure ducendae facultas. 
Conubium habent cives Romani cum 
civibus Romanis; cum Latinis autem 
et peregrinnis ita, si concessum 
sit. Cum servis nullum est con-
bium.13 
Also certain bars existed which further prevented 
certain marriages: (i) There was a minimum age requirement 
for marriage based generally on puberty. For girls the age 
was twelve. There is some dispute concerning boys. The 
Sabinians felt that the boy should have reached puberty 
and that a physical examination was necessary, while the 
Proculians demanded only that the boy be fourteen. This 
14 latter school of thought has been the prevelant one. 
(ii) Both parties must be of sound mind. (iii} According 
to Augustus' statute, senators and their sons could not 
have iustae nuptiae with a freedwoman or any other undig-
nified woman, nor could a woman of senatorial rank marry a 
man of lower rank. (iv) Roman officials in a province 
were forbidden to marry women of that same province. 
(v) Not until Septimus Severus could soldiers of ordinary 
rank marry during their time of service; even if a child 
were conceived before one's entry into the service and 
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born while one was in the service, the child was not con-
sidered to be a product of iusta nuptia. 15 (vi} According 
to the Digest 23.2, guardians were not allowed to marry their 
wards. 16 
There were also certain degrees of relationship 
which made marriage impossible: (vii) Originally any blood 
relationship nearer than and including first cousins was 
forbidden, but by the end of the third century B.C. marriage 
between first cousins was allowed. 
Inter eas enim personas quae 
parentum liberorumve locum inter 
se optinent nuptiae contrahi non 
possunt, nee inter eas conubiurn 
est, veluti inter patrem et filiam, 
~el inter matrem et filium, 17e1 
inter avum et neptem . . . 
(viii} Also forbidden to marry were uncle and niece, and 
great uncle and great niece. However, the Emperor Claudius 
stated that marriage with a brother's daughter was lawful, 
since he wished to marry Agrippina, his niece. Three and 
a half centuries later the old rule was restored. 
Fratris filiam uxorem ducere licet, 
idque primum in usum venit cum 
divus Claudius Agrippinam fratris 
sui filiam uxorem duxisset, sororis 
vero f iliam ducere non licet et 
haec ita principibus constitutionibus 
significantur.18 
(ix) Augustus' Lex Papia forbade those of senatorial order 
from marrying actresses, but the Emperor Justin allowed 
this type of marriage, thus permitting his nephew Justinian 
to marry Theodora. In 542 A.D. Justinian abolished for 
all senators these restrictions relating to the m~rriage 
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agreements. 1 9 Justinian, however, because of religious 
scruples, forbade marriage between the baptized and his or 
her sponsor. 
If both parties were Roman citizens and not restrict-
ed from marrying for any reason, then the marriage was 
iustae nuptiae and the children of that marriage were iusti 
liberi and cives optima iure (possessing all civil rights). 
If one party was a Roman citizen and the other was a mem-
ber of a corrununity having ius conubii but not full civitas 
the marriage was still iustae nuptiae,but the children of 
that marriage took the civil standing of the father. If 
either party were without ius conubii the marriage was legal 
but nuptiae iniustae and the children, though legitimate, 
20 
received the rank of the lower degree. 
Matrimonii Modi 
In Roman times there were two types of marriage: 
(i) cum manu and (ii) sine manu. The earlier and original 
form of marriage, cum manu, was that in which the woman 
passed into the manus of her husband. She left her agnatic 
(amU.y 8lh1 becmm·"! G membr·r \'t' his family as if she were 
adopted. Whatever property she took with her became part 
of the property of her husband or his paterfamilias. Her 
husband had control over her and she stood in loco f iliae 
to him.21 Marriage sine manu appears to date back as far 
as the XII Tables, but cum manu was the common ~orm of 
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marriage. By the end of the Republic sine manu, however, 
was the common form and cum manu the exception. In a sine 
manu marriage the woman did not come under the power of 
her husband nor did she even become a member of his agnatic 
family; she remained under the postestas of her father if 
alive and if not she was sui iuris and a tutor was appoint-
ed as though she were single. According to civil law, she 
was not related to her children; they were under the 
potestas of her husband. A marriage of this type required 
no ceremony. All that was necessary was the consent of the 
parties and, if they were in potestate, of the patres, to-
gether with a de facto beginning of a conjugal agreement. 
h · f h · h d b ·a 22 T e intent o t e parties a to e ev1 ent. 
Cum Manu Matrimonia 
There were three different methods for establish-
ing a marriage cum manu. These methods were established 
first by the XII Tables. 
Conf arreatio 
Conf arreatio was a religious ceremony requiring 
t \\8 prPRPlh'~ t~f <\ lr1<\,\ \ \hl pr h'ttt. This type of marriage 
was limited to the aristocratic patrician class, though 
not necessarily legally. According to Gaius, the name 
comes from the use of spelt bread (pannis farreus) in the 
sacrifice made to Jupiter Farreus. 
9 
Farreo in manum convenient per 
quoddam genus sacrif icii quod 
Iovi Farreo fit; in quo farreus 
panis adhibetur unde etiam 
confarreatio dicitur.23 
The Pontifex Maximus and Flamen Dialis had to be 
present at the ceremony along with ten witnesses. This 
form of marriage was requisite for the four highest state 
priesthoods - Rex Sacrorum, Flamen Dialis, Flamen Martialis, 
and Flamen Quirinalis. Not only did the holders of these 
offices have to be married by confarreatio,but their par-
ents also had to have been married by this same procedure. 24 
. nam flamines maiores, id 
est Diales, Martiales, Quirinales, 
item reges sacrorum, nisi ex farreatis 
nati non leguntur; ac ne ipsi quidem 
sine confarreatione sacerdotium 
habere possunt.25 
Coemptio 
Coemptio was a fictitious sale of the wife to the 
husband, and in early times may have actually been a sale. 
The purchase was a certain application of mancipatio, a 
mode of transferring certain types of valuable property. 
Coemptione vero in manum convenient 
per mancipationem,id est per quan-
dam imaginariam venditionem. Nam, 
adhibitis non minus quam V testibus 
civibus Romanis puberibus, item 
libripende, emit is mulierem civis 
in manum convenit.26 
There are two views of the original nature of 
coemptio. (i) It never was a real purchase, but came 
into existence after mancipation had become a "fictitious 
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sale." It was introduced by the plebians so they could 
acquire rights over their wives in the manner that the 
confarreatio granted these rights to patricians. Before 
this, plebian marriages had not been recognized according 
to civil law. Therefore, the plebians wanted recognition, 
and also desired to counter the patrician claim that per-
sons born of unrecognized unions were not fit for state 
offices. Therefore,"in support of this view it is urged 
that coemptio is too purely secular an institution to be-
long to the earliest stratum of Roman law. 1127 
(ii) It was "the Roman form of the widely spread 
institution of marriage by purchase, and ~hatj originally 
some real consideration was given to her father or guard-
ian in exchange for the bride, or 
(manus) over her. 28 
., for the power 
The latter view seems to be the most acceptable, 
for marriage by purchase was so common among other nations 
that it seems the same was probable in Rome. Also in ref-
erence to the first theory it does not seem likely that 
in a legally conservative nation there would be a delib-
erate introduction of a new form of marriage for merely 
1 . . th th, 1 . . 2 9 po it1cal purposes, ra er an re ig1ous purposes. In 
the coemptio ceremony at least five persons had to be pre-
sent as witnesses and a sixth as libripens or balance hold-
er. The precise words and forms used for the ceremony 
are unknown, but most likely they were similar to those 
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used in the mancipatio ceremony.30 
Us us 
Usus was the acquisition of a wife by possession. 
Usus was related to coemptio in the same manner as usucapio 
to mancipatio. A Roman citizen who bought some property 
and got possession but not ownership because he failed to 
follow certain forms outlined by jus civile might become 
owner through the process of usucapio, i.e. through a lapse 
of time. If the object were in his continuous possession 
for one year he might then become owner. 31 
There are two theories relating to the institution 
of usus: (i) Usus originally was not a separate form of 
marriage, but arose from the principle that any defect in 
the other forms of marriage would be cured by the de facto 
relationship of man and wife for one year. Confarreatio 
and coemptio were both complicated ceremonies, and any slip 
concerning the correct procedure would make the marriage 
invalid, but if the parties lived together for one year 
the defect would become void and manus would then occur. 
Often it was difficult to distinguish between a defective 
ceremony and no ceremony at all. Therefore, it became 
accepted that if two people lived together with the 
intention of being married they would, without participat-
ing in any ceremony, be married cum manu at the end of one 
32 year. There was, however, a devise which would cancel 
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the manus relationship but not the marriage. This privi-
lege of defeating manus was granted by the XII Tables. It 
was at first probably a device of patricians to protect 
their interests, for occasionally patrician women married 
plebians. If the wife remained apart from her husband for 
three consecutive nights during the year she failed to en-
ter the manus. By this contrivance a woman could prevent 
becoming plebian herself, and if she had any property she 
could keep it out of the husband's control. Therefore, 
at her death her property went to her patrician agnates. 33 
This informal type of marriage was known as matrimonium 
jure gentium and was possible even for aliens. However, 
the wife was known only as uxor and not materfamilias,and 
the children followed the mother; they did not pass under 
the potestas of the father. 34 
(ii) Another view relating to usus was that it was 
originally a separate method of contracting marriage - a 
type of marriage on approval. It was 
comparable to the 'handfast' mar-
riages found at one time in the 
north of England and in Scotland, 
which became permanent if the wo-
man bore a child or became preg-
nant within a year and a day, but 
might be dissolved if she did not. 35 
Usus might also be connected to marriage by capture -
the idea being that if the union lasted for one year the 
father lost his right of power over his daughter. The dif-
ficulty in this theory for the modern mind is b~ing able 
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to distinguish between marriage and concubinage. This was 
not a problem for the Romans who regarded marriage as a 
de facto relationship distinguishable from concubinage by 
attendant events such as betrothal and the festivities 
which customarily attended the marriage. The intention of 
the parties to marry had to be manifest. 36 
Conf arreatio continued to be the prevailing type 
of marriage until the time of Cicero. At the time of 
Gaius marriage was generally secured by coemptio,and at the 
time of Justinian only the freer type existed. Confarreatio 
only survived for specific purposes however (religious priest-
hood). Actually by the time of Gaius manus was virtually 
obsolete. By a gradual development which was probably com-
plete by the time of Cicero, the informal marriage had come 
to be the formal marriage and thus recognized as justum 
matrirnonium; although the wife did not come under the hus-
band's power, the children of the marriage did.37 
Effectus Civilis Matrimonii 
Once a civil marriage had been established several 
effects were produced: (i) The children were liberi 
iusti and in potestas of the paterfamilias and were agnates 
of his agnates. (ii) Apart from manus the wife did not en-
ter her husband's familia and therefore was not concerned 
with his religion. (iii) The wife did not necessarily take 
the husband's name though during the Empire she often did. 
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(iv) The wife shared the husband's honorific titles. (v) Their 
properties remained distinct. (vi) Gifts between them were 
void. Apart from issue, the effects of marriage legally 
were the result of the Roman conception of liberum matrimonium. 
Whether the parties were married or not was important if 
there were issue and for that reason there were certain 
rules for a valid marriage. Relief against error of status 
was given only if there were issue. If there were no issue 
no relief was necessary; the parties could end their re-
lation at any time.38 
Dos 
In addition to the civil effects of a marriage, 
another important concern was that of dos. Dos or dowry 
was the "transfer (or promise to transfer) of things having 
a money value from the bride's side - her family or friends 
- to the husband."39 The husband became full owner of the 
property, and the dos was intended to help defray some of 
the expenses which were a part of marriage. Dowry was not 
trival. There was no set rule that it had to be the 
intestate portion, i.e. what she could expect from her 
father's estate in any event; but that this was at least 
the socially expected magnitude is suggested by the rules 
of collatio datis, whereby a woman claiming a share of 
paternal inheritance might have to bring her dowry into 
account.40 
In a marriage cum manu the property of-a woman sui 
iuris passed to her husband. If the daughter were under 
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the power of her father it was customary for the father to 
provide a dowry for the husband. This dowry could also be 
supplied by other interested persons, other than the 
father. If the marriage were sine manu the woman could own 
property and even have property given to her, but it was 
still customary for the dowry to be given to the husband. 
Generally there was much negotiation about dowry arrange-
ments prior to marriage - pacta dotolia. The arrangement 
could be of almost any type. 
There were three kinds of dos: (i) dos profecticia -
provided by the father or other paternal ancestor whose 
legal duty it was to provide the dowry for the woman, (ii) 
dos adventicia - dowry corning from any other source, (iii) 
dos recepticia - a type of dos adventicia but given on the 
agreement that it be returned to the donor on the wife's 
death. The dos might be constituted in three ways: (i) 
aut datur - handed over at the time the agreement was made, 
(ii) aut dicitur - ancient verbal contract in which the 
bride, paternal ascendant, or debtor might agree informally 
to give it. This type became obsolete. (iii) aut 
promittitur - this was the ordinary course followed in 
which the dos was not actually handed over at the time of 
the agreement. The person agreeing to give the dos bound 
himself to do so by a solemn stipulation. From the time 
of Theodosius and Valentinian, a mere promise to give the 
dowry became actionable as a pactum legitimum.41 At the 
termination of a marriage various things could happen to 
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the dos. If the dos were recepticia, i.e. if the donor 
prior to marriage made the husband agree to restore the 
dos, then the donor or heir could compel restoration. If 
no such stipulation had been made the husband according to a 
strict view of civil law was entitled to keep the entire 
dos for himself. The wife, though, had a moral claim for 
the return, and often or usually it was recognized. 
About 200 B.C. a new action, actio rei uxoriae 
appeared. This differed from an actio ex stipulatu because 
it allowed for the recovery of dos at the end of marriage 
even though no agreement had been made for its return. 
The actio rei uxoriae was a bonae f idei situation as 
opposed to the stricti juris interpretation of actio ex 
stipulatu. Therefore, the judge was not bound unconditionally 
to order the return of the dos,but had the discretion to 
enforce such equities as he thought best. The judge might 
make allowances to the husband for expenses pertaining to 
property, or if the termination of marriage were due to the 
wife's adultery or other fault, the judge could make a 
reduction from the amount to be returned, the amount 
depending on the seriousness of the offense. On the other 
hand, if the termination was due to the fault of the 
husband, the wife might then recover more than the 
original sum of the dos. Unlike actio ex stipulatu, 
actio rei uxoriae did not pass to the heir. If the wife 
predeceased the husband, the husband was allowed to keep 
all the dos except dos profecticia. Justinian changed 
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this law so that the dowry had to be returned in every case 
except for misconduct of the wife. The husband could claim 
rebate only concerning outlay upon dotal property necessary 
for its preservation. The husband was also forced to make 
compensation for any movable property which he had alienated 
or for damages to the dotal property due to his negligence; 
and as a further protection Justinian gave the wife tacita 
hypotheca (implied mortgage) over her husband's estate.42 
Gifts originally were not allowed between husband 
and wife, but under Christian emperors a donatio ante nuptias 
(later propter nuptias) was allowed. This was a gift to the 
bride from the groom or his family, often matching in value 
the dos. This was set aside for the wife's future use if 
she should survive her husband. Though set aside, the 
husband meanwhile could use and enjoy it. If the wife died 
before him or if divorce occurred without fault on his part 
it was extinguished. If the wife survived the husband and 
there was issue she then had life use of the donatio for 
herself and her children. But if there were no issue then 
it passed to his heirs, unless specific arrangements had 
been made to the contrary. If marriage were terminated by 
divorce because of the husband's fault, he was penalized by 
losing the donatio and it passed to the wife. 4 3 
Other property which the wife owned that was not 
part of the dos or donatio was known as parapherna. The 
husband had no right over the wife's bona paraphernalia 
except what she granted him. 
18 
Potestas Problema 
A paterfamilias could not order his married children 
to divorc~ but they could not marry without his consent. 
Whether he could order them to marry a particular person 
is a complex question. The Digest 23.2.21 states that he 
could not do so concerning his son~ and the same is implied 
in Gellius (Noctes Atticae II, 7, 20) concerning the son's 
moral duty. " ... he ought to obey; but if his father orders 
him to take a shameful or criminal wife . . • he should not 
obey, for if turpitude enters into the question these things 
are no longer indifferent." The father, however, could make the 
situation more difficult concerning the daughters. The 
Digest 23.1.11-12 says, "that a daughter's consent is 
necessary for bethrothal, but adds that anything short of 
positive resistance is taken for consent, and consent can 
only be refused if the proposed bridegroom is morally unfit." 
The control of the paterfamilias did not apply in the sphere 
of public affairs, but privately one was in the control of 
the paterfamilias; if one were in potestate he owned nothing. 
Whatever was acquired accrued to the paterfamilias. One 
could make no gifts and if one borrowed, the debt was owed 
to the paterfamilias. Loans of money to sons in potestate 
produced many problems. Therefore, during the reign of 
Vespasian a decree made it impossible for a lender to sue 
the paterfamilias for payment on such loans. As a result 
it was very unlikely that loans were made to thos~ in 
potestate. How then was a filius familias with a wife and 
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a separate home able to run his own household if he owned 
nothing? There are two possible answers neither supported 
by much evidence: (i) emancipatio took a son out of 
potestate but generally this was used only for misbehavior, 
(ii) there existed the institution of peculium - "a son in 
potestate like a slave could have a fund which, though 
ultimately belonging to the head of the family, was in 
practice his to manage, and on the basis of which he could 
contract. 11 44 This situation was most probable for sons 
living independently, but in potestate; but the situation 
certainly had its limitation~ for the peculium actually 
belonged to the paterfamilias and could be terminated by the 
paterfamilias at any time and was part of the estate of the 
paterfamilias when he died. Augustus' legislation invented 
an extra peculium, the Eeculium castrense (military fund) -
what a son acquired by or for the purpose of military ser-
vice was his own. He could will it however he pleased, but 
if he did not it reverted to the paterfamilias as part of 
the peculium. The son could alienate the peculium castrense 
at any time, and the father was unable to touch it. 45 
Augustus may have introduced this program to encourage 
volunteer enlistment in his army. 
In the time of the early Republic the foundation 
of Roman social life was monogamous and marriage was domi-
nated by the husband, but it would be wrong to assume that 
sexual relationships were confined to marriage; free sexual 
intercourse co-existed with marriage. 
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According to Bachofen, The Right of the Mother, 
there are three stages of marriage: (i) primitive stage -
indiscriminate sexual intercourse, (ii) intermediate stage -
marriage dominated by the wife and (iii) highest ~tage -
marriage dominated by the husband. 
. . . This is the highest type 
of law and it was most purely 
developed by Rome. Nowhere else 
did the ideal of potestas (power) 
over wife and child reach such 
complete maturity; and so nowhere 
else was the corresponding ideal 
of a unified political imperium 
(supreme power) so consciously 
and consistently pursued." "The 
Romans banished from their laws 
the physical and materialistic 
view of human relationships, more 
completely than any other nations; 
for Rome was from the first 
founded on the political aspect of 
the imperium; in conscious adherence 
to this as~ect Rome pursued her 
destiny. 4 
A sort of matriarchy may have prevailed for many 
centuries before there was the real development of the Roman 
family based on patria potestas. Remnants of this matriarchy 
remained in the '~ree sexual intercourse which co-existed 
with the monogamous marriage recognized by the state. 11 47 
Much of this paper has been devoted to the 
institution of marriage, its development, its forms and the 
laws concerning it. However something must be said concerning 
the actual ceremony itself and the many customs and festivi-
ties surrounding it. 
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Nuptiales Ritus 
A Roman wedding was only allowed to occur on certain 
days. Forbidden days were the entire month of May because 
of the Argean and Lemuria offerings and the first half of 
June because of the religious days connected with Vesta. 
Also forbidden were the first half of March as well as the 
Kalends, Nones, and Ides of each month and each day following 
them. Also avoided were the dies parentales (February 13-21) 
and the days when the entrance to the lower world was open, 
August 24, October 5, and November 8. Numerous Roman 
festivals were also avoided on religious grounds and also 
great holidays because people usually had other engagements. 
Women marrying for the second time often chose these holidays 
in order to make their wedding less noticeable.48 
The actual marriage rites began the day before the 
wedding. The young bride laid aside the dress she had worn 
as a girl and dedicated it to the gods along with her child-
hood playthings. Then she put on her bridal attire, the 
tunica recta or regilla. This was a white tunic, woven in 
one piece and falling to the floor. Fastened about the 
marriage tunic was a band tied in a manner called the knot 
of Hercules, probably because Hercules was the guardian of 
marriage and the patron of good fortune. Only the husband 
was allowed to untie the knot of Hercules.49 Over the 
tunica, the bride wore a cloak or palla of saffron color and 
around her neck she wore a metal collar. Covering her head 
the bride wore a large veil called the f lammeum. This 
22 
veil draped over her head but did not cover her face. The 
veil was flame colored - a yellow - reddish hue, the color 
sacred to the god of marriage, Hymen. Matching the veil in 
color were the shoes she wore. Special emphasis was paid 
to the arrangement of her hair. It was the custom for the 
groom to part the bride's hair into six plaits. This was 
done with the bent point of an iron spearhead. A spearhead 
which had recently killed a gladiator was considered 
especially effective, since the parting of the hair may have 
been done to dispel the evil spirits which reside particu-
larly in the hair.SO The six locks were fastened with wooden 
fillets (vittae) at the top of her head in the shape of 
a cone (meta) called a tutulus. This was a primitive 
coiffure which except for some priestesses was used only 
for brides on their wedding day. Under her veil the bride 
wore a crown of flowers which she had gathered herself. 
The groom also wore a wreath of flowers on his head. 51 
Others at the ceremony also wore wreaths of flowers. The 
bride's house, if the ceremony occurred there, was 
decorated with flowers, tree boughs, bands of wool, and 
tapestries. 
Cicero says (De Div. i. 16, 28) that the marriage 
began by the taking of the auspices early in the morning of 
the ceremony day. Quondam rnaioris rei nisi auspicato ne 
privatim quidem gerebatur, quod etiam nunc nuptiarum 
auspices declarant, qui, re omissa, nomen tantum tenent. 
Meanwhile the guests were assembling and were 
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informed of the auspices. The marriage contract was then 
completed in the presence of ten witnesses. Then the bride 
and groom solemnly declared that they agreed on the marriage. 
They were next led to each other and their hands were brought 
together by a pronuba (usually a married woman representing 
Juno). The couple then moved to the altar to offer the 
chief sacrifice, (ancient times - fruit or far, and in later 
times - pig or bullock) . They sat on two seats tied together 
with sheepskin. The auspex nuptiarum or the attendant priest 
of this confarreatio ceremony recited words of prayer for 
the couple to repeat while walking around the altar. Then 
good wishes were extended to the couple and the banquet 
began. The wedding feast was generally at the home of the 
bride's father, rarely at the groom's home. The feast 
ended with the distribution of the wedding cake, mustaceum. 
These feasts became so extravagant that during the reign of 
Augustus it was suggested that a limit of 1,000 sesterces 
b~ set, but this never became law.52 At night the last 
stage of the ceremony began - the deductio, procession, 
escorting the bride to her husband's house. Ancient custom 
dictated that the bride be torn by her husband from her 
mother. Festus (288) said, "They pretend that the girl is 
torn away from the protection of her mother, or if her mother 
is not present, from the protection of her next-of-kin, when 
she is dragged to her husband. 115 3 This custom may point to 
the primitive marriage by capture and may also be a reference 
to the rape of the Sabine women. The bride was ·then escorted 
in a procession to the husband's house. 
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Three young people whose fathers were still living 
simulated a rape and carried the bride to the husband's house. 
The bridal couple in a carriage was preceded by flute players 
and a boy with a torch, which had been lit at the hearth of 
the bride's father. Surrounding and following them were the 
guests and the public. Phallic songs were sung and there 
may have been a phallic dance. Such a procession is referred 
to in Catullus' famous marriage song, #61, an invocation to 
Hymen. Everyone in the procession was shouting "Talasio" 
and had no idea of what it meant. The procession to the 
groom's house occurred even when the groom was absent and 
therefore played his part by letter or messenger.54 The 
bride carried three coins with her. During the procession 
she dropped one as an offering to the Lares Compitales, gave 
one to the groom as a symbol of the dowry and gave the last 
to the Lares of her husband's house.SS When the procession 
reached the husband's house the boy carrying the torch threw 
it away, and a mad scramble for it ensued, for its possession 
promised a long life. If either the husband or wife had 
been trapped into marrying and wished to ensure the other's 
quick death, the bride, if she caught it, should extinguish 
it and place it under the marriage bed; and the groom, if 
he caught it, left it on a tomb and allowed it to burn 
itself out. 56 The wife then annointed the doorposts with 
oil and bound them with woolen threads. Then she was lifted 
over the threshold and received fire and water and together 
the bride and groom lit the new hearth. She was· afterwards 
25 
sprinkled with water and therefore admitted to share the 
domestic and religious life of her husband. In the hall 
of the groom's house was found a small be.d for the groom's 
genius and the bride's juno. 
Consummation also followed certain customs. The 
pronuba had prepared the marriage bed and instructed the 
bride. The bride prayed to Juno Virginensis and to Circia 
(goddess to whom the loosening of the girdle was consecrated) • 
The husband loosened his wife's girdle, but only women who 
had been married once could undress the bride on her wedding 
night.57 The bride then sat down (probably naked) on the 
phallus of the god of fertility, Mutunus Tutunus.58 In most 
ancient times the first intercourse was probably in the 
presence of witnesses. Also friends of the husband may have 
had intercourse with the bride. Bachofen says, 
Natural and physical laws are 
alien and even opposed to the 
marriage tie. Accordingly the 
woman who is entering marriage 
must atone to mother nature for 
violating her and go through a 
period of free prostitution, in 
which she purchases the chastity 
of marriage by preliminary 
unchastity.59 
The sexual intercourse was superintended by a series of 
deities whose names represent various stages of the act. 
In later times husband's friends threw nuts into the bridal 
chamber.60 The day after the wedding, a second wedding feast 
occurred, the repotia. Friends and relatives attended this 
and here the bride made her first offering as matrona. 
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One should not suppose, however, that the entire 
complicated ceremony was always observed even in first 
marriages, especially since, as has been stated earlier, 
no ceremony was required for marriage. 
Roman marriage was an institution much influenced 
by tradition and symbolism as evident in the actual cere-
mony. Tradition and custom would probably have allowed 
parents to arrange a child's marriage. It was customary 
that marriages were arranged for the good of the state, but 
it seems incredible that the child did not rebel against 
this action. Roman youth were obviously taught that the 
state came first. 
The consent of the paterfamilias.was a complex 
issue. Legally it may not have been requisite, but 
customarily it had to be given especially for a young man 
if he were in potestate. He was dependent on his 
paterfamilias for a livelihood. He could never be financially 
independent, for anything which he might accrue had to 
revert to the father. In this situation the power of the 
purse was mighty! 
The institution of marriage changed greatly from 
the time of the XII Tables to the time of Justinian. 
Originally the husband had marital power over the wife; 
she fell under his potestas or under that of his 
paterfamilias; and all of her property, if she had any, came 
with her. Gradually during the late Republic and early 
Empire the idea appeared that the wife ought not to have 
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to change her status - that she should remain as she was 
prior to marriage, and that she should be as free and 
independent as her husband. This free type of marriage was 
very much in vogue at the time of Gaius and Justinian. 
The husband no longer had tyra'nnical control over his wife. 
They each retained their own identity - even to the extent 
of keeping their properties separate. They were two 
distinct individuals! The wife no longer legally became a 
member of her husband's family. 
CHAPTER II 
DIVORTIUM 
The marriage agreement under Roman law was considered 
a contract and was "consistently logical in recognizing that 
marriage like any other contract might be broken or dissolved. 116 
Roman law held that a contract not to divorce was invalid, 
because it infringed on the right of married couples to di-
vorce if they ever so desired. 62 Divorce law changed greatly 
as Rome grew from a small city to an empire. 
It has been asserted that for the first 500 years of 
Rome's existence there was no divorce until approximately 
230 B. c. when Spurius Carvilius divorced his barren wife. 
That divorce did not take place until this late date is un-
likel~ for the XII Tables of 451 B. C. recognized freedom of 
divorce under the formula Res tuas tibi habeto and the wife's 
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surrender of the household keys. Therefore, Carvilius' 
divorce may have occurred in the seventh or sixth century B. c.6 
At the time of the kings a husband could divorce his 
wife for adultery, tampering with the keys, or poisoning a 
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child. Under the ancient marriage laws, a wife in manu 
(no independent status) could not divorce her husband, but 
if he divorced her she could obtain release from the marital 
66 
control of manus. 
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Divortii Actiones 
There were two distinct types of divorce actions: 
(i) repudium - divorce by the will of either husband or 
wife and (ii) divortium - divorce by mutual consent. Ori-
ginally repudium was granted only to the husband, but later 
was extended to the wife, and divortium was not possible 
for a manus marriage. 67 The Christian clergy unsuccessfully 
tried to do away with divortium, but it continued until 
Justinian. A marriage of manus, performed by a ceremony of 
confarreatio, was dissolved by a diffareatio ceremony (rel-
igious ceremonies corresponding to marriage ceremonies). 
Divorce was not possible for the Flamines Diales, married 
by confarreatio. There is only one instance of a divorce of 
a Flamen Dialis,and that was granted by special permission 
of Domitian. 68 
Gaius indicates that after Tiberius changed the 
confarreatio procedure, a wife could divorce or be divorced 
through the repudium procedure. In other marriages of co-
emptio or usus marriage was dissolved by a remancipatio 
ceremony - for the most part the same procedure used for 
the emancipation of a daughter. 
In manu autem esse mulieres desinunt 
1sdem modis quibus f iliae familias potestate 
patris 11berantur. Sicut igitur filiae 
familias una mancipatione de potestate 
patris exeunt, ita eae quae in manu 
sunt una mancipatione desinunt in manu 
esse, et si ex ea mancipatione manu-
missae fuerint, sui iuris efficiuntur.69 
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Inter earn uero quae cum extraneo et 
earn quae cum uiro suo coernptionern 
fecerit, hoc interest, quod illa quidern 
cogere coernptionatorern potest u~ se 
rernancipet cui ipsa uelit, haec autern 
uirurn suurn nihilo rnagis potest cogere I 
quarn et f ilia patrern. Sed f ilia quidern 
nullo rnodo patrern potest cogere, etiarnsi 
adoptiua sit; haec autern Tuirurn] repudio 
rnisso proinde cornpellere ~otest atque si 
ei nurnquarn nupta fuisset. 0 
Where marriage was sinu rnanu divorce was free to 
either party. Just as marriage began by a de facto beginning 
as husband and wife so it also ended if this life were brok-
en by a desire to divorce by either party. But mere sep-
aration did not constitute a divorce; the intention of 
divorce had to be made manifest to the spouse. The husband 
could send the wife away using the traditional formula* or 
the wife could leave declaring her wishes for the marriage 
to end. No particular form was used, but generally there was 
a written or oral message, and repudiurn or nuntiurn mittere 
became conunon expressions of divorce.71 
In the Republic and in earlier classical law the 
paterfamilias had the power to end by divorce a marriage 
of his child, without his child's consent. Reference is 
made in The New Testament to possibly this type of divorce where 
Paul writes that Pius forbade separation of a bene concordans 
matrirnonum by the father. However, this may mean that though 
the divorce were valid, the father could not compel actual 
separation.72 Marcus Aurelius abolished this paternal 
priviledge of divorcing a daughter without her permission; 
but, nevertheless, in the Justinian Code there is one instance 
* cf. p. 28 
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remaining when divorce was not granted unless with parental 
permission - when the mother or father paid the dowry and 
would suffer harm at its forfeiture. 73 
There were no divorce courts during the Republic, and 
though a wife might repudiate her spouse she could take no 
legal action against him, even if he were guilty of adultery. 
If a wife were unfaithful her husband simply divorced her 
and retained part of the dowry, or if the marriage were manu 
then a family tribunal, including her relatives, was summon-
ed and she might be sentenced to death. 74 
By the end of the Republic divorce was common place, 
especially in Rome. It was alleged that women reckoned the 
years by husbands and not by consuls. Juvenal speaks of 
ladies "having eight husbands in five years. 1175 Most likely 
this was an exaggeration, but, nevertheles~ based on some 
truth. A husband might even divorce his wife in her absence. 
Cicero ended his marriage to Terentia by letter.76 
Divortii Leges 
Augustus 
Augustus through legislation tried to change the 
trend of frequent divorces. His statute Lex Julia de Adult-
eriis of 18 B. C. restricted the form of divorce. Under 
this legislation a written bill of divorcement (libellus 
repudii) ought to be delivered to the other party but was 
not compelled. The divorce had to take place before seven 
adult male citizens, and their seals were required if the 
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intent of divorce were in writing. Later, this became the 
only acceptable form of divorce.77 
Under the statute of Lex Julia adultery was made a 
public crime. Permanent courts were set up to hear cases 
against married women and their paramours. A married man 
was liable as a paramour if he seduced another's wife and 
if she were prosecuted by her husband. He was also liable 
for prosecution if he practiced stuprum - an offense if his 
mistress were not a registered prostitute. Women of respect-
able origins were not permitted by the Senate to register as 
prostitutes. 78 Augustus' purposes in reforming divorce law 
were 
. . . to devise some satisfactory 
form of proof that divorce had in 
effect taken place; to make adultery 
and other gross immorality (stuprum) 
crimes actionable before a special 
court, and to prevent connivance in 
a wife's adultery or a husband's 
part by encouraging the public in-
former who, at Rome, doubled the 
part of public prosecutor.79 
Augustus' new laws established new duties for hus-
bands. If he discovered his wife in an adulterous act he 
must divorce her, or if he were dependent on his father, his 
father on his behalf prosecuted the divorce. Failure to 
do this could have resulted in the husband being prosecuted 
for condoning adulterous behavior, and if he were condemned 
he would be punished as an adulterer. He was allowed sixty 
days after the divorce to bring action against the guilty 
wife and lover. If the husband wished to forgive hi·s wife 
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or if he felt that divorce were adequate punishment, the 
common informer was present to prevent this. The informer, 
who often profited by Augustus' laws, had four months in 
which to prosecute. The time limitation did not commence 
until sixty days from the granting of the divorce had passed. 
If the informer waited six months after divorce or five 
years after the alleged offense he could no longer prosecute.so 
Augustus' legislation saw an end to the husband's 
right to kill the wife if discovered in adultery, though 
if the lover were found in his house the husband could kill 
the lover if he were an inferior person, such as a slave 
or family freedman. However, the wife could be killed by 
her father if he caught her in the act and if he killed 
or tried to kill the adulterer at the same time.Bl Augustus' 
laws also ended family tribunals except when the Senate 
felt that the offense should be investigated privately in 
lieu of public court. Augustus' legislation seems to have 
had one immense weakness. It did not provide any means 
for a wife to directly prosecute her husband for adultery. 
If a husband were questioned for adultery it was not through 
the insistance of his wife but rather his lover's husband. 
Constantine 
During Constantine's reign the laws concerning adul-
tery became even more strict than those of Augustus. Much 
of the legislation can be attributed to the influence of the 
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Christian religion and its strict moral codes. It was not 
until Constantine that adultery was made actionable in the 
case of the husband as well as the wife. For centuries 
Stoicism had deplored the double standard privileges for hus-
bands, and the Jewish and Christain religion had imposed by 
its religious code a higher standard of morality than the 
1 . d 82 1 . aw require . P utarch said, "a husband who bars his wife 
from the pleasures in which he himself indulges is like a 
man who surrenders to the enemy and tells his wife to go on 
f . h . 83 ig ting. 
During Constantine's reign if a wife were found guil-
ty of adultery, she and her lover were banished to differ-
ent islands; the wife lost one-half of her dowry, one-third 
of her property, and it was a criminal offense for anyone to 
remarry her. Her lover was also deprived of one-half of his 
property. After Constatine both guilty parties were con-
84 dernned to death. Constantine enacted that if divorce occur-
red outside of acceptable grounds, a wife might be penalized 
concerning her dos and she might even be deported, and a 
husband lost his right to ever remarry. If he did remarry, 
the divorced wife might seize the second wife's dos. Ninety 
years later this extreme penalty was restricted to cases 
where where there were no grounds for divorce, and if the 
grounds were insufficient the wife might not remarry and the 
85 husband not for two years. 
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Justinian 
These laws did not appear under Justinian but there 
were similar provisions. He set up other legitimate grounds 
for divorce and if divorce were not due to a recognized 
ground, the wife was to be confined to a nunnery for the 
remainder of her life, and she had to forfeit her property 
to various uses, including the nunnery. The husband was sub-
. t 1 t . lt . 8 6 f . JeC on y o pecuniary pena ies. I remarriage occurred 
by either party after divorce, there was legislation aimed 
at preserving for the children of the first marriage the dos 
and donatio connected with that marriage. In the Republic, 
penalties were much less severe and a causeless divorce 
might have involved only a nota censoria and a loss of dos. 87 
Under Justinian a man could be fined in the wife's 
favor. If he brought divorce without sufficient reasons, he 
could be fined one-third of all the property she acquired at 
her marriage. Sufficient grounds are found in the Justinian 
Code. These grounds, from a constitution of Theodosius and 
Valens, included "strong suspicion on either side of the 
other party having engaged in adulterous, criminal, or trea-
sonable practices, or keeping the company of flagitious 
characters, or using or threatening personal violence, es-
pecially of a kind outrageous to the freeborn citizen."88 
Dos 
The dowry was a deciding factor in many divorces. 
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Dowry (dos) is a gift to the husband from the bride to help 
defray the husband's expenses pertaining to married life. 
For a manus marriage, a woman's property passed to her husband, 
and if she were under the control of her father, the father 
would provide the dowry. If the marriage were sine manu she 
could own property, but nevertheless a dowry was usually 
given to her husband. If the dowry were given by the bride 
or someone for her, it was called dos adventicia. Origin-
ally, neither in a ~marriage nor sine manu did the hus-
band appear to have any legal duty to return the dowry if 
the marriage were terminated by divorce. 89 
At the time of the XII Tables neither a wife nor her 
father had any right to claim any portion of the dowry, if 
the wife were guilty of any one of the three acceptable 
d f d . 90 groun s o 1vorce. If she were expelled from the home 
for any other reasons, the husband was required to give his 
wife one-half of his property. This was the situation in 
the case of Spurius Carvilius. According to Aulus Gellius, 
Servius Sulpicius in this book on Dowries said 
Servius quoque Sulpicius in libro, 
quern composuit De Dotibus, tum 
primum cautiones rei uxoriae 
necessarias esse visas scripsit, 
cum Spurius Carviliu~ cui Ruga 
cognomentum fuit, vir n~bilis~ 
divortium cum uxore fecit, quia 
liberi ex ea corporis vitio non 
gignerentur . · .91 
Technically Spurius Carvilius should have given one-
half of his property to his divorced wife, for she had committed 
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none of the offenses that were legal grounds for divorce. 
The probability is that the penalty was not exacted as was 
the custom. No legal action could be taken against him to 
require him to return the dowry. This particular case was 
very significant to the Romans. After this it was wise for 
the bride's father or guardian to make personal financial 
arrangements in case the marriage failed. 
Many divorces were restrained because of financial 
considerations. Marcus Aurelius at the suggestion that he 
divorce Faustina replied, "What - and return the dowry?" 
meaning the empire, for he had succeeded his father-in-law, 
92 the former emperor. 
When Cicero divorced Terentia he had a very difficult 
time coming up with the necessary money to return the full 
amount of the dowry. It is most probable that when he died, 
four years after his divorce, the dowry still remained un-
"d 93 pa1 • 
An interesting case involving dowry rights is that of 
C. Titinius of Minturnae who applied to Judge C. Marius to 
receive the dowry of his divorced wife on the grounds of 
immoral character. The judge knew that Titinius had known 
of her character prior to marriage and married her with fut-
ure divorce and dowry in mind. Therefore, the judge imposed 
a small fine on her and forced Titinius to pay a sum equal 
to the amount of her dowry. She later repaid Marius by hid-
94 
ing him in her home when he was fleeing from Sulla. 
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Often a divorced wife or her father or tutor in her 
behalf had to go to court to recover the dowry. In the early 
Republic, a judge had complete discretion over the matter, 
but by the end of the Republic there were fixed rules. If 
a wife or her father sought divorce a husband could get 
one-sixth for each child up to three children. If the wife 
were guilty of adultery, he might retain an extra one-six~h. 
If she were guilty of a less serious offense he might retain 
. h h 95 an extra one-eig t . 
If a husband did not return the dowry a woman of 
marriageable age would have a difficult time remarrying. 
Therefore,many changes occurred in the laws concerning dowry 
rights as the divorce rate increased. 
In many cases the giver of the dowry could stipulate 
prior to marriage that the dowry be returned in the event 
of divorce (actio ex stipulatu) . If the dowry was not re-
turned a special action (actio rei uxoriae), which appeared 
approximately in 200 B. C., was allowed to the wife for the 
return of the dowry or part of it when the marriage was dis-
solved by divorce. "The action was almost certainly in bonum 
et aequum concepta. 1196 The actio rei uxoriae was an action 
of bonae fidei. The judge was not legally bound to return 
the dos but had discretion to decide as he thought best. 
He could make allowances for the husband, for the expenses 
on property and for marriage termination due to the adultery 
of the wife. Generally a reduction in dowry return would 
occur. If the husband's misconduct was the reason for divorce, 
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th 'f . ht b d d 1 h th . . 1 d 97 e wi e mig e awar e a sum arger t an e origina os. 
Justinian greatly changed the laws regarding dowry. 
He said that a husband had to restore the dowry in every case 
except misconduct of the wife. The husband could only. claim 
rebate for outlay expenses concerning preservation of dotal 
property but was forced to make amends for any movable prop-
erty which he had alienated or for damage to the dos through 
his negligence. Justinian also added tacita hypotheca (im-
plied mortgage) over the husband's whole estate. 98 
Donatio 
Similar to dos was donatio propter nuptias, a gift 
given by the husband. Originally it was given only before 
marriage since Roman law did not allow gifts between hus-
band and wife, but Justin I allowed that the gift might be 
increased after marriage. Justinian added that donatio 
might then be constituted after marriage, and the former name 
ante nuptias was therefore changed to propter nuptias. Even-
tually the husband's relatives were obligated to provide a 
donatio, just as the bride's relatives provided the dos for 
the husband. The donatio had to equal in monetary value the 
dos. The control or management of the donatio and the dos 
was given to the husband, but under Justinian the husband 
could not alienate the immovable part of donatio even with 
the consent of his wife, and the wife had tacita hypotheca 
to secure the donatio. At the dissolution of the marriage 
by divorce because of the husband's misconduct, the wife had 
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a life estate in the property, sharing the dominum with 
issue. 99 
Alimony was unknown in the present sense to Roman 
law. Alimony, however, is of Roman origin, but only as a 
claim of support by a ward against an unfaithful guardian. 
A praetor would fix the amount necessary for support (alimenta) . 
Alimony between husband and wife did not exist.100 
In Roman times divorce was not a disgrace, in spite 
of the restrictions. The dowry system made it possible for 
a woman to live without the support of her husband. 
The Romans according to modern standards certainly 
allowed some unfair practices to exist. Women seemed to have 
been placed on a pedestal which demanded the utmost moral 
behavior. They could be killed for committing adultery 
whereas the man received a reprimand of some sort, such as 
banishment, the return of the dowry, etc., but certainly 
not anything comparable to the loss of one's life. Even 
though Roman women did not play an active role in politics, 
it does seem that they could have found a way to change the 
law to make the punishment fair for both men and women. 
Augustus• legislation concerning adultery was far 
from fair. He did not allow anyone the right to a mistake. 
There was no margin for error. Whatever the attendent cir-
cumstances if a husband caught his wife in an adulterous , 
situation he had to initiate divorce. He had no choice; for 
if he chose not to do this, he could then be prosecuted as 
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an adulterer himself. This law certainly seems to be a 
weakness in Augustus' legislation, for it allowed no room for 
personal choice or for a mistake. It did not matter whether 
or not the husband wished to initiate divorce proceedings. 
The choice wasn't his. It is amazing that the Roman people 
accepted this notion and lived by it. 
CHAPTER III 
TUTELA ET CURA 
"The power of a guardian is the form of family 
power which takes the place of paternal power when there is 
no one to exercise the latter." lOl There were two kinds of 
guardianship: (i) tutela and (ii) cura. Both were charged 
with care of the person as well as the person's property. 
The distinction between the two was in the manner in which 
the ward's property was handled. 102 
Tutela 
In reference to tutela, John Crook says "it originated 
as a right of agnate relatives to keep a hold over property 
which, if the infant did not grow up and have heirs, was 
due to come to them - to see that the inf ant was not cozened 
into squandering it; and similarly with the woman sui juris, 
to prevent her from disposing of family property. 111 03 
The essence of tutela lay in auctoritas interpositio, 
i.e. "the assistance which the tutor is required to give 
. . t. t t b 1 d d nl04 in order to enable Juris ic ac s o e cone u e . 
Tutela supplies a method by which a person who is incapable 
of performing juristic acts is cured of this disability. 
42 
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Auctoritas interpositio may be accompanied by gestio, i.e., 
the right to make decisions on behalf of the ward which are 
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necessary for the general management of the property. 
Generally, there were two types of tutela: (i) 
tutela impuberum and (ii) tutela perpetua mulierum. 
Permissum est itaque parentibus 
hiberos quos in potestate sua 
habent testamento tutores dare: 
masculini quidem sexus impuberi-
bus . . . que cum nuptae sint. 
Veteres enim voluerunt feminas, 
etiamsi perfectae aetatis sint, 
propter animi levitatem in 
tutela esse.106 
Every child who was sui iuris and under the age of puberty, 
i.e. fourteen, had to have a tutor. Tutela originally was 
considered as an artificial extension of potestas until 
the child was capable of potestas for himself. Tutela was 
less in the interest of the child than of the guardian 
since the tutor received the property if the ward died 
impubes .107 
Tutela ended for males when puberty was attained, 
but often it was supplemented by devices such as rest-
itutio in integrum and curatio (similar but less protec-
tion) • 
Itaque si quis f ilio f iliaeque 
testamento tutorem dederit, et 
ambo ad pubertatem pervenerint, 
filius quidem desinit habere 
tutorem, £ilia vero nihilo 108 
minus in tutela permanent ... 
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Modi Designandi Tutores 
Gaius and Justinian classify tutors according to 
the method of appointment: (i) testamentarii, (ii) legitimi, 
(iii) fiduciarii, (iv) a magistratu daviti. 
Tutela Testamentaria. The XII Tables authorized the pater-
familias to appoint tutors by will to sui heredes impuberes. 
Jurists later extended this right to postumi, those not 
sui heredes when the will was made but who were born after-
wards. This included children born after the will was made 
or after the testator's death, or even grandchildren who 
became sui heredes by the death of the father after the 
grandfather's will was made. 109 
Cum tamen in conpluribus aliis 
causis postumi pro iam natis 
habeantur, et in hac causa 
placuit non minus postumis 
quam iam natis testamento 
tutores dari posse, si modo in 
ea causa sint ut, si vivis 
nobis nascuntur in potestate 
nostra fiant. Hos etiam 
heredes instituere possumus, 
cum extraneos postumos heredes 
instituere permissum non sit.110 
Ordinarily appointment of a tutor by will was 
sufficient, but in certain cases confirmation by a magistrate 
was necessary, e.g. if the ward receiving the tutor had been 
emancipated. 
Sed ei emancipate filio tutor 
a patre testamento datus fu~rit, 
conf irmandas est ex sentent1a 
praesidis omnimodoi id est, 
. . .. t' e 11 sine inqu1s1 ion . 
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Under Justinian there were no precise rules of form. A 
testator could appoint any one who was persona certa and 
testamenti factio (i.e. capable of making a testament), and 
it had to be manifest to which child or children he was 
appointed. The appointment might be conditional or from 
or to a certain time. 112 A testator could even appoint a 
slave simultaneously giving him freedom. In Justinian's 
time mere appointment denoted freedom unless the testator 
appointed a slave "cum liber erit." Otherwise, the appoint-
ment was invalid if the testator did not free the slave or 
indicate that he was to be freed at a later date. The 
appointment of another person's slave was invalid i>f the 
condition "cum liber erit" were not attached. The heir was 
then bound, if possible, to purchase him and free him. 113 
Tutela Legitima. This type of tutelage was probably older 
than the XII Tables. It represented a primitive notion of 
tutela, i.e. the right of potential successors to look after 
the estate. An impubes to whom no tutor had been appointed 
by will would have a legitimus or statutory tutor. There 
were three types of tutela legitima: (i) legitima agnatorum, 
(ii) legitima parentum tutela, and (iii) legitima patronorum 
tutela. 
Legitima Agnatorum Tutela. According to the XII Tables a 
person sui iuris and under the age of puberty and having no 
testamentary tutor had as his tutor his nearest agnate or 
several of the same degree) . · 
agnates (if there were 
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Quibus autem testamento tutor 
datus non sit, his ex lege 
duodecim tabularum adgnati 
sunt tutores, qui vocantur 
legi timi. 114 
They became tutors because they would become heirs 
to the property on death intestate and without issue. 
"Ubi successionis est emolumentum ibi et tutelae onus esse 
debet." 115 In early law if there were no agnates the 
tutelage passed like property to the nearest gentile. This, 
however, disappeared by the beginning of the Empire. 116 
After the 118th novel of Justinian,tutela was given to the 
nearest cognate capable of being guardian instead of the 
117 
nearest agnate. 
Legitima Parentum Tutela. The paterfamilias who emancipated 
a person in potestas and under puberty not only acquired the 
right of succession but also became the tutor. 
. . . nam si quis filium aut 
f iliam, nepotem aut neptem ex 
f ilio et deinceps impuberes 
emancipaverit legitimus eorum 
tutor erit. 118 
Legitima Patronorum Tutela. If a master manumitted a slave 
under puberty, then the master and his children after his 
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death became the slave's tutor and patron. 
. . . libertorum et libertarum 
tutela ad patronos liberosque 
eorum pertinet. . . . Eo enim 
ipso quod hereditates libertorum 
libe~tarumque, si intestati 
dicessissent, jusserat lex ad 
patronos liberosve eorum.pertinere, 
crediderunt veteros voluisse 
legem etiam tutelas ad eos 
. 120 petinere: · · · 
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Tutela Fiduciaria. This type of tutela arose when the 
emancipation of a child under puberty was made by the 
extraneous manumissor who then became the child's tutor 
fiduciarius. This was obsolete in Justinian's time when 
the tutela f iduciaria only arose if the paterfamilias 
emancipated a person in his potestas who was under puberty, 
and then himself died. Then the unemancipated male children 
of the deceased father became fiduciary tutors of the 
emancipated person. 
. . . nam si parens f ilium vel 
f iliam, nepotem vel neptem vel 
deinceps impuberes manumiserit, 
legitimam naciscitur eorum 
tutelam: quo defuncto, si 
liberi virilis sexus ei extant, 
f iduciarii tutores f iliorum 
sudrum, vel fratris vel sororisl21 
et ceterorum efficiuntur .... 
For example, A has two sons, B and C. A emancipates B at 
age eleven and then becomes his tutor. A dies and C becomes 
fiduciary tutor until B attains the age of fourteen. 122 
Tutela A Magistratu Dativa. 
Si cui nullus omnino tutor sit, 
ei datur in urbe Roma ex lege 
Atilia a praetore urbano et maiore 
parte tribunorum plebis, qui 
Atilianus tutor vocatur; in 
provinciis vero a praesidibus 
provinciarum lege Iulia et 
Titia.123 
If there were no tutor one was appointed by the 
magistrate, but this was not a normal magisteral function. 
It existed only because it was expressly created by certain 
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legislation. Some time before 186 B.C. the Lex Atilia was 
passed which stated that if an incapable person sui iuris 
was without a tutor at Rome the praetor urbanus should 
appoint one with the cooperation of the majority of the 
plebian tribunes. In the provinces this appointment was 
made by the praesides under the Lex Julia et Titia (31 B.C.). 
This appointment usually occurred if there were no tutor: 
or if those which existed were disqualified, excused or 
removed. In later law it was customary to appoint a curator 
if a testamentary tutor were temporarily excused. A tutor 
was appointed only if actual auctoritas to some formal act 
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was needed. 
Vicissitudines Tutelae 
The idea of tutela as a public duty was at this 
point beginning to supersede the early idea of tutela as an 
advantage to the guardian. Therefore the actio tutelae was 
introduced which made the tutor accountable for any loss 
the ward had suffered due to the fault of the tutor, whether 
. . d . . t . th t t 1 2 5 intentional or negligent, in a minis ering e es a e. 
This action was a great advance over earlier law in which 
the tutor was liable only if he actually embezzled property 
of the ward. 
The actio tutelae was applicable only in case of 
guardianship over impubes. No action ever developed in the 
case of adult women, for the position of the tutor was 
different. If a woman were not in manu she had to have a 
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tutor, but guardianship over women was only a burdensome 
technicality, remaining from an earlier period. The woman 
administered her own estate and only needed the tutor's per-
mission for certain types of transactions. Tutors, other 
than those holding tute1a legitima, as parents or patrons, 
could be forced if necessary to give approval to transactions 
which the woman desired. A method was also developed where-
by a woman could obtain a different tutor if she wished. 
To do this, a coemptio fiduciae causa was used; the woman 
made a co-emptio with any man she wished and then fell under 
his control, manus. He then mancipated her to whomever she 
desired as a tutor; and he who held her in mancipio manumitted 
her, thereby becoming her tutor. This was performed in the 
same manner as a man who manumitted a female slave and then 
became her tutor. It was also possible for the husband 
while in the process of appointing by will a tutor for his 
wife in manu to let her choose the individual she desired 
f She d . d 126 and even to change as o ten as es1re . The unreal-
ity of tutelae of adult women in classical law is evident 
by the number of devices for changing one's tutor. 
Nominatio Tutoris 
Any friend or relative could initiate the appoint-
ment of a tutor when needed and where applicable. If no 
one initiated an appointment, creditors and others might 
give notice for them to apply; and if the tutorless defaulted, 
they could apply to the magistrate. 
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Anyone who was appointed tutor had a public duty 
to serve unless he met certain disqualifications or accept-
able excuses. Modestinus applies the rules to all tutors, 
but classical law stated that the excuses applied only to 
legitimi or fiduciary tutors. 
Excusationes. Excuses had to be pleaded before the officer 
in charge of tutorial appointments and within limits of time 
dependent on distance from the location of court. The grounds 
of excuse were numerous. General grounds were age, perman-
ent ill health, ignorance, poverty, exile, the occupying of 
a high office, having a certain number of natural born child-
ren and holding three substantially independent guardianships. 
Special grounds might be litigation or hostility between 
the involved parties or remoteness of residence. Sometimes, 
the grounds for excuse were temporary. 
One who had promised the father that he could serve 
as tutor could not later excuse himself. A libertus appoint-
ed by a magistrate to his patron's child could not plead 
an excuse, but if he were appointed by the patron's will 
to be a collibertus he could then plead an excuse to prevent 
confirmation of the appointment by the magistrate. Any per-
son appointed by the father as tutor, whether subject to 
confirmation or not, claiming an excuse lost any benefit 
under the father's will, apart from testator's indication 
'to the contrary. 
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Impedimenta. There were several restrictions placed on 
tutorial appointments. (i) Generally, a woman could not 
be a tutor. However, in A. D. 390 this was changed. If 
there were no legitimus or testamentary tutor, a mother if 
she desired could be appointed tutor provided she took an 
oath not to remarry. If she did remarry, the tutela ended 
and her husband might be sued on liabilities already accrued. 
(ii) To be under the age of twenty-five was an excuse in 
classical law but not at the time of Justinian. Being an 
impubes was always a disqualification except for legitimi 
tutelae,and Justinian made it an excuse for all cases. 
(iii) Deaf or dumb persons could not be tutores, except 
legitimi in classical law, and Justinian excluded them al-
together. Lunacy was only a temporary excuse instead of a 
disqualification, for lunacy was considered curable. During 
classical law there was no bar at all for legitima tutela. 
(iv) Some persons due to their station or function could 
not be tutors. Milites and certain officials could not 
be tutores even if they were willing, and there were certain 
cases in which a person of one class could not be appointed 
to one of another class. (v) Misconduct was not an abso-
lute disqualification but would come under consideration 
. . t . t t 127 during a magistrate's inquiry prior o appoin men . 
Off icia Tutoris 
The duties of the tutor were numerous. In some 
cases he had to give security, ~ salvam pupillo fore. 
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Security was not required of a testamentary tutor or of one 
confirmed or appointed by superior magistrates after an in-
quiry. If the tutor was a patron or patron's filius and 
if the estate were small and the tutor a man of substance 
and probity, the security might be remitted. If security 
were required, the acts of the tutor did not bind the pupil 
t ·1 th ·t h db 'd d 128 un i e securi y a een provi e . 
Administratio. The first step in the actual administration 
of tutela was the inventory of the estate. Failure to do 
so resulted in heavy liabilities. Under Justinian the tutor 
could be released from this inventory by the testator from 
whom the property came. 
The tutor was required to provide out of the estate 
an appropriate sum for the maintenance of the child. The 
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magistrate sometimes would determine the appropriate amount. 
The real business of the tutor was with the patri-
monium and there were three functions: (i) the management, 
improvement, and preservation of the ward's estate, (ii) 
the education and general care of the ward, (iii) the 
acting on behalf of the ward or co-operating with him in 
1 1 Vall.di'ty to his acts. 130 order to import ega 
The tutor had to care for the ward's property and be 
watchful for its increase as if it were his own. If a 
guardian failed to make the obvious gains, he was liable 
within two months of assuming duties to make good the loss; 
and if he were not financially able to do so, he was liable 
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for judicial punishment under the old law. But Justinian 
allowed them to gradually replace the loss unless the ward's 
Pr . . 0 f b . t h d b . . d 131 ov1s1 ns or necessary su sis ence a een 1mpa1re . 
In A. D. 195 Severus forbade tutores to sell lands 
except by direction of will or of magisterial authorization 
in case of emergency. Even though alienation was forbidden, 
the tutor was still entitled to sell unproductive or perish-
able moveables, urban property, and urban slaves. He was 
bound to sell it if the interest of the ward's property re-
quired it. This system was not completely satisfactory. 
Therefore, Constantine forbade the tutor to sell urban or 
surburban propert~ or valuable moveables except in circum-
stances which justified the sale of rustica pra~dia. 
The tutor had to make every effort to recover debts 
due to the ward. He must invest the ward's money within a 
certain time, and if he delayed he was liable for the lost 
. 132 interest. 
Auctoritas interpositio was the co-operation of 
the tutor with the ward. An act was done by the ward with 
the auctoritas of the tutor. The authority involved the 
presence of the tutor, for the tutor had to orally declare 
his approval. A child was not legally able to act until he 
had reached a certain level of development; he must have 
intellectus. The tutor then simply provided judgement and 
wisdom. until the fifth century infantia meant the in-
capacity to speak, but in A. D. 407 the limit of infantia 
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was fixed at seven years. After a child reached the age of 
seven he had mental intelligence but not judgment. There-
fore, the tutor added auctoritas to the ward's actions, thus 
making them legal and binding for both the ward and the per-
son with whom he dealt. The authority of the tutor was not 
necessary in two instances: (i) the release of the ward 
from obligations and (ii) the acquisition by the ward of 
rights of inheritance or succession. 
A tutor could not authorize any acts in which he had 
an interest. If he were the sole tutor,no such transaction 
was possible unless a tutor praetorius was appointed for 
the purpose of authorizing it. However, if there were 
other tutors one of these could authorize the transaction. 
Not all transactions needed auctoritas; the ward could per-
form transactions which would benefit him but not bind him 
even if the transaction bound the other party. But if the 
transaction bound the ward then the auctoritas of the tutor 
was necessary.133 
Causae Tutelae Terminandae 
There were many ways by which a tutela ended. Tutela 
ended if there occurred the death, capitis deminutio or 
puberty of the ward, or if the date or event till which the 
tutor had been appointed occurred. The completion of the 
purpose for a temporary tutor also ended the tutela. 
death, capitis deminutiol34 (maxima or media) of the 
The 
tutor, 
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i. e. the loss of caput, or a supervening ground of exemption 
ended the tutela. Capitis deminutio minima of a tutor was 
applicable only for tutores legitimi. The tutela would 
end and pass to the person with the next civil law right of 
succession. 
A tutor was liable for misconduct. If a crimen 
suspecti tutoris occurred then there may be a petition for 
the tutor's removal based on the XII Talbes. He would be 
tried before the chief magistrate of the district. Any one 
might bring the petition except the impubes himself. 
Immediately on accusation a tutor was suspended 
from acting. Removal had no definite grounds and, therefore, 
was at the discretion of the court. If the evidence showed 
dolus,the tutor became infamis (but not for incompetence or 
negligence). The proceeding ended if the tutor died or the 
tutela otherwise ended. The misconduct had to have occurred 
during the tutela, but in later law it might have been before 
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the actual administration. 
A guardian was also liable for fraud, neglect, or 
the waste of the ward's property. He could not alienate the 
ward's property for malfeasance (crimen suspecti). If he 
wasted or alienated the ward's property, he could be removed. 
He was also liable to double the value fine or restitution 
to the ward when he reached the age of majority or upon his 
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own removal. 
If there were several tutors, it was possible for all 
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to administer but it was not convenient. If there were sev-
eral testamentary tutors the auctoritas of one sufficed 
except in a matter which would end the tutela. The tutors 
might administer in command,or they might arrange privately 
to a distribution of power and control in which case those 
not acting were liable only in the last resort. 
Removal of a tutor was not a remedy but a preven-
tion of future damage. However, there were remedies against 
tutores who failed in their obligations. (i) Actio de 
rationibus distrahendis was an action which lay against any 
tutor at the termination of the tutela. Essentially, it 
was delicatal, giving double damages and available to but 
not against the heredes. It dates from XII Tables and prob-
ably originally applied to the legitimi tutores. (ii) Actio 
tutelae dates from the Republic and gave remedy for any 
breach of duty. This remedy was applicable only at the end 
of a tutela and condemnation involved infamia. Originally , 
it was used only for maladministration; therefore, it was 
not applicalbe if the tutor refused to act at all. How-
ever, during the first century of the Empire the law was 
changed; and a tutor became responsible if he were ordered 
to act by a magisterial decre~ and in the second century 
inaction was practically equal to maladministration. 
The ward's claim took precedence over any other 
unsecured debts of the tuto4 and during later law the ward 
had tacita hypotheca. This action was available to and 
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against'the heredes. After the accounts were settled, a 
tutor could deduct what had been properly spent out of his 
own funds. If a problem arose, the tutor had recourse to 
' 
actio contraria tutelae whereby he could claim reimburse-
ment. 
The ward had other remedies for maladministration. 
If security had been given, action lay against this or the 
promise of the tutor and those of his sureties but not till 
the end of the tutela. An action also lay against inferior 
magistrates who had not properly or adequately exacted the 
required security. However, they were liable only as a 
last resort and only if they had not taken necessary pre-
cautions and reasonable security at that time. 
If there were several tutors, each was liable in 
actio de rationibus distrahendis but only for his own mal-
versation. If they all acted in common they were all liable 
in actio tutelae. If they acted individually, then those 
not acting were liable last. 
An action also lay against a protutor (a person who 
acted as tutor but not by a valid appointment), and it could 
be initiated even by third persons who had suffered loss due 
to the intervention of such a one not qualified to give 
auctoritas. 
Cura 
The essence of cura lay in gestio*. The curator 
*cf. p. 43 for definition. 
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had no auctoritas interpositio; therefore, he could not 
enable an incapable person in concluding a juristic act. 
There were three types of cura: (i) cura minoris, (ii) 
cura furiosi and (iii) cura prodigi. 
Cura Minoris 
As early as the middle Republic it was obvious that 
the ending of tutela over males at the age of fourteen left 
them in a precarious position, for they did not yet have 
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the maturity to be in sole control of their fortunes. 
The XII Tables did not provide any protection for those who 
had attained the age of fourteen. Thus in the second cen-
tury B. C. the lex Plaetori~ or as often written lex Laetoria, 
was introduced which gave an action to anyone of either sex 
below the age of twenty-five against persons whom they 
claimed to have defrauded them. Following this the praetor 
offered a remedy in which a restitutio in integrum should 
occur whenever one under twenty-five years of age had been 
defrauded. In addition, if one defrauded a person under 
twenty-five he was then liable to criminal prosecution and 
infamy. 138 As a result of this, transactions with minors 
were performed very hesitantly unless they had someone with 
them to sanction their actions. Therefore, it became quite 
common for minors to apply to the proper authorities for a 
curator or guardian to authorize their actions until they 
reached the perfecta aetas of twenty-five years. It was 
not obligatory for one who attained puberty to have a curator, 
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but if he had much property it was the tutor's duty to en-
courage him to apply. 
Item inviti adolescentes curatores 
non accipiunt, praeterquam in litem; 
curator enim et ad certam causam 
dari potest. 139 
A curator was appointed not only when a law suit was 
involved, but also when a debtor wished to pay a debt o~ed 
to the youth or the tutor wished to settle his accounts 
with the youth. The curator, once he had been appointed 
held the office until the ward was twenty-five years of 
age. An exception to this was possible by a special grant 
of the emporer if the curator felt the ward was capable 
of managing his own affairs, but it was necessary that the 
man be at least twenty and the woman eighteen. 140 
Cura Furiosi Et Prodigi 
According to the XII Tables the protection of lun-
atics and spendthrifts vested in the nearest agnate though 
later a curator could be appointed by the authorities. In 
both cases a man's relatives could get complete control over 
his property against his will, and yet according to Crook we 
do not know what the ancients used as their criteria for 
determining whether one was a lunatic or a spendthrift. 
Furiosi quoque et prodigi, licet 
majores viginti quinque annis sint, 
tamen in curatione sunt adgnatotum 
ex lege duodecim tabularum; sed solent 
Romae praefectus urbis vel praetor, 
et in provinciis praesides ex 
inquisitione eis curatores dare.141 
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The curator of the furiosus ceased to act during 
the lucid intervals of the furiosus, for he was considered 
to have the capacity to act on his own. In early law there 
seems to be some doubt as to whether the curator needed 
a reappointment during the non-lucid periods or whether a 
new curator was appointed. Howeve~ in later law the curator 
did not need a reappointment on the relapse of the furiosus. 
There is little information available as to the pow-
ers of the curator of the prodigus. The prodigus was often 
able to execute on his own acts which could not harm the 
estate. Otherwise, the consent of the curator was always 
necessary. The appointment seems to have been continuous 
until the appointment was officially removed. Also placed 
under curatorship,in addition to those of unsound mind,were 
those of physical disabilities which would interfere with 
the managing of their own affairs. 
Sed et mente captis, et surdis, 
et mutis, et qui perpetuo morbo 
laborant, quia rebus suis superesse 
non possunt, curatores dandi sunt.142 
The function of the curator differed from that of 
the tutor, but many similarities between the two existed. 
The rules as to whom the magistrate appointed, the security 
given, excuses, reasons for removal, restrictions on power, 
and the reasons for termination were in later law mostly 
the same. For this reason a separate discussion of these 
matters will not appear in this paper. 
The role of curatorship of minors seems to be 
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unnecessary. The reason this position existed was because 
many felt that a boy of fourteen was not yet ready to 
manage his own estate. Why didn't the Romans extend the 
age one was under tutelage unless they felt curatorship was 
a stepping stone from tutelage to manhood and independence. 
Another perplexing situation was the situation in 
which a father emancipates a son in potestas and then be-
comes his tutor. Why would a father do this? Obviously, 
if the son needs a tutor he is under fourteen. Why wouldn't 
the father wait? Possibly he felt death was at hand and 
wanted his son independent when that time came. By his 
son being independent, taxes might possibly be lowered. 
Whatever the reason, it must have been advantageous. 
Another problem seems to exist between the father 
and son. Why would a father appoint a slave as a tutor to 
his son? The slave would certainly have to be specia~ for 
it seems that most slaves due to their station in life 
would not have the expertise to handle one's estate, unless 
he had been taught business matters by the paterfamilias. 
But it does seem odd that a slave would be appointed over 
a family member unless there was no one in the family who 
was qualified. 
As evident in this paper the institution of tutela 
and cura was a most complex one. The role of tutor or cura-
tor was considered a public duty; and, therefore, it could not 
be lightly refused. In order for this aspect of law to 
work the utmost co-operation of Roman citizens was 
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requisite, but why would one undertake such a responsibility? 
Certainly the administration and caring of another's estate 
was an immense task, and in addition the tutor or curator 
was answerable for maladministration. What a responsibility 
and burden! The institution however was a necessary one in 
order that proper care of estates would exist. Even though 
the guardians - if they were agnates - might benefit, still 
the responsibility was tremendous. But the guardians 
were certainly aware of the fact that someone in their f am-
ily might one day be in a position which required a tutor 
or curator. This fact would certainly make one more agree-
able and acceptable to a guardian's duties. 
CHAPTER IV 
ADOPTIO ET ADROGATIO 
Adoption was an extremely important aspect of Roman 
law. "A well known feature of the social history of Rome 
is the infertility of the governing class, its failure to 
rear enough children to maintain its numbers." 14 3 There 
were many reasons for this situation: disease and the ensu-
ing high death rate, the lack of interest of women in child-
bearing, etc. The remedy for the lack of family was adoption, 
and the primary purpose of adoption was to keep a family 
from becoming extinct. The welfare of the children was not 
144 
a primary concern; in fact, often those adopted were adults. 
Charles Sherman says that adoption was probably earlier in 
Roman law than wills,but the purpose of both was the same: 
"to avoid the extinction of a family by death of its head 
without heirs. Hence the endeavor of the law to provide 
. b 'f' . 1 1 . h' 11145 fictitious heirs y an art1 icia re ations ip. Ad op-
tion was quite essential to the pagan Romans; for if there 
were no heirs, it prevented the family's religious worship, 
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the sacra,* from extinguishing. Through adoption the re-
ligious rites were perpetuated. This desire for family 
continuity was very powerful at Rome, and for this reason 
the Romans felt that if the bond existing between a father 
and a son could be broken by emancipation it could also be 
146 
created be adoption. 
In Republican times there were two entirely diff-
erent forms of adoption: adoptio and adrogatio. 
Through adoptio a person who is 
under the paternal power of the 
head of his family comes under 
the patria potestas of another 
(adoptator, pater adoptivus). 
The change of family (mutatio 
familiae) is the characteristic 
feature of the adoptio, while in 
an adrogatio, i.e., the adoption 
of a person sui iuris who is him-
self the head of a family, there 
is a fusion of two families since 
the adrogatus enters into another 
family together with all persons 
subject to his paternal power. 
The legal effects are equal in 
both cases; the adopted persons have 
the same rights (succession) and 
duties (sacra) as natural sons.147 
The modes of these two types of adoption also differed. 
According to Gaius, 11 Populi auctoritate adoptamus eos qui 
sui iuris sunt: quae species adoptionis dicitur adrogatio 
. Imperio magistratus adoptamus eos qui in potestate 
parentum sunt. 11148 According to Aulus Gellius: 
Quod per praetorem fit, adoptatio 
dicitur, quod per populum arragotio. 
* Sacra - i.e. the worship of both a deity and ances-
tors of the family. These rites were performed by heirs -
not only natural descendants of last head of family but even 
by heirs through adoption. 
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adoptantur autem, cum a parente 
in cuius potestate sunt tertia 
mancipatione in iure ceduntur 
atque ab eo qui adoptat apud 
eum legis actio est vindicantur: 
adrogantur hi qui, cum sui iuris 
sunt in alienam sese potestatem 
tradunt eius que rei ipsi auctores 
fiunt.149 
Adoptio 
Adoptio was a mode of acquiring patria potestas 
over persons not born into the family. In adoptio, a person 
under one potestas was given into another's potestas, and 
the adopted were under the same paternal power as natural 
children. No specific declaration seems to have been required 
for the adoption of a son already under potestas i.e. one 
termed alieni iuris. The child became property, through 
. t' f th 150 mancipa 10, o e new owner. 
An elaborate form of adoption existed which was 
derived from the XII Tables stating that if a father sold 
his son three times (mancipatio) the son was free from his 
father's power. 
The father, A, sold X, the son, 
to B, B freed him and he reverted 
to A's potestas. This was repeated. 
Then there was a third sale which 
destroyed the potestas and left the 
son in bondage to B. C, the intending 
adopter, now brought a conclusive ac-151 
tion against B claiming X as his son. 
Since there was no defense, the judge decided in favor of 
c. B and C could be the same person but then X went back. 
to A after the third sale, and the claim was then made against 
A. 
If a paterfamilias gave his daughter or granddaughter 
in adoption one sale was sufficient. The sale was performed 
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by a formal mancipio. The transaction had two parts, a 
preliminary sale which destroyed the potestas and the act 
of adoption, i. e. the claim and declaration in court. 
Justinian made the adoption of alieni juris simple. 
Instead of the elaborate ceremony just described, he substi-
tuted a simple proceeding of executing a deed in magisterial 
presence declaring adoption. The parties involved (i.e. the 
persons given, giving, and receiving) had to be present 
to give their consent. But it was also sufficient if the 
. 153 . person being adopted did not dissent. Adoption affected 
only the adoptee - if the adoptee already had children they 
remained in the old family. 
It was possible to adopt one's own child no longer 
in one's potestas, even though the child had been given to 
another previously in adoption. But a son so adopted was 
a new person; he was no longer the father of any children 
he had left behind. An adoptive child might be emancipated 
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or given in adoption, but he could not be readopted. 
Justinian greatly altered the laws on adoption. 
Since adoption could be lighly undertaken and lightly ended, 
Justinian provided safeguards for the adoptee lest he dis-
cover that he was free and not belonging to any family due 
to emancipation. Justinian provided that the adoptee retain 
his rights of succession in the old family which he often 
lost under the old law. As a member of the new family he 
would acquire only a right of succession if the adoptive 
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father died intestate, and no right of complaint if he were 
bypassed l·n a w1·11. 155 Th d t' f th l'k th e a op 1ve a er, un 1 e e 
natural father, was not bound to leave the adopted son a 
share of the estate if he made a will. The adoptee in 
Justinian's time did not pass into the potestas of the 
adoptive father. The type of adoption just discussed 
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Justinian referred to as adoptio minus plena. In this 
type of adoption the adoptee passed into the physical con-
trol of the adopting person but legally remained a member of 
his old agnatic family. The only legal effect was that the 
15 
child acquired a chance of intestate succession to the adopter. 
This was a drastic change, for prior to Justinian, adoption 
placed the adoptee in the exact position he would have had 
had he been born into his adopted family. 
Sed hodie, ex nostra constitutione, 
cum f iliusf amilias a patre naturali 
extraneae personae in adoptionem 
datur, jura potestatis patris naturalis 
minime dissolvuntur, nee quicquam ad 
patrem adoptivum transit, nee in po-
testate eius est, licet ab intestate 
jura successionis ei a nobis tribute 
sint. 158 
The old law prevailed under Justinian if the adopted son 
were given to a natural descendant or ascendant (e.g. the 
grandfather of the adopted child) . Justinian referred to 
this type of adoption in which the old law of succession 
prevailed as adoptio plena. An adoptive son could only 
enter the family of his maternal grandfather per adoptionem. 
And if the adoptive son were born after the father was eman-
cipate~ he would not be in the same family of his paternal 
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grandfather except by adoption. The adoptive son may even 
be adopted by his natural father, for if he were born before 
his father was emancipated then the grandfather may have 
emancipated his father but not him and then later might give 
him to his father per adoptionem. 159 
A person could adopt one as a grandson, granddaugh-
ter, great-grandson or great-granddaughter or any other des-
cendant even if he had no son. 
Licet autem et in locum nepotis 
vel neptis vel in locum pronepotis 
vel proneptis vel deinceps adoptare, 
quamvis fitium quis non habeat.160 
According to the system of paterfamilias, it seems 
that to have a grandson in one's power one must have a son 
as the sons of daughters do not fall under the same pater-
familias. However, the maternal grandfather could adopt. 
For marriage it often made a difference whether one was adop-
ted as a grandson or great-grandson, for the natural grand-
daughter of the adopter would be cousin or neice of the 
adopted depending on whether one was adopted as son or grand-
son and could marry him in one case but not the other. 
A man could also adopt the son of another as his 
grandson and could adopt the grandson of another as his son. 
He could also adopt a grandson to be given as a son to any 
son provided that son's consent were given, for the adopted 
would then become an heir of the son's and not of the adop-
ter.161 on the contrary if a grandfather gives his grandson 
- 162 by a son in adoption, the consent of the son is not necessary. 
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Conditiones Adoptionis 
Certain conditions had to be met in order for adoption 
to occur. The parties involved must be of the requisite 
age, i. e. eighteen years and there must be a required 
number of intervening years, i. e. eighteen years. Accord-
ing to Justinian a younger person could not adopt an older 
person. The principle adoptio naturam imitatur was the 
guiding principle for adoption. 
Minorem natu non posse maiorem 
adoptare placet: adoptio enim 
naturam imitatur et pro monstro 
est, ut maior sit filius quam 
pater. Debet itaque is, qui sibi 
per adrogationem vel adoptionem 
filium facit, plena pubertate, 
id est decem et octo annis praecedere. 163 
The principle adoptio naturam imitatur applied in several 
other instances also: (i) In Cicero's time, an unmarried 
man could not adopt, 164 but in later law an adopter did not 
have to be married. A castratus could not adopt, for nature 
could never give him children. An impotent person however 
could adopt, for nature could possibly cure the impotency. 
Illud vero utriusque adoptionis 
commune est, quod et hi generare 
non possunt, quales sunt spadones, 
adoptare possunt.165 
(ii) Women initially were not able to adopt, because they 
were incapable of patria potestas. According to an inter-
polated constitution dated 291 A. D. Diocletian allowed a 
woman who had lost her own children to adopt as a means of 
consolation, but she still did not have patria potestas over 
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them. Justinian allowed this type of adoption provided the 
Emporer's permission was given. In the constitution the 
woman apparently was sui juris, but Justinian's law did not 
have this limitation.166 
Feminae quoque adoptare non possunt, 
quia nee naturales liberos in sua 
potestate habent. Sed ex indulgentia 
principis ad solatium liberorurn 
amissorum adoptare possunt.167 
Adrogatio 
In adrogatio a person sui juris and independent be-
came alieni juris by placing himself under the potestas of 
another citizen. This institution was older than adoptio 
and was very importan4 for it destroyed one family and merg-
ed it with another. Though this form underwent certain 
changes during Roman histor~ its effect and tone were un-
altered. 
Originally there was a preliminary inquiry by pontiffs 
as to whether the case or request was admissable and satis-
fied certain legal requirements. If approved, the case was 
then sent before the comitia curiata,in this case called the 
comitia calata,which met on special days for this and other 
business affecting sacra. The meeting was presided over by 
the Pontifex Maximus. 168 Originally no woman or Roman sub-
ject could introduce an adrogation procedure, for they did 
not have access to the assembly. 169 The reason for the approval 
of the assembly and the religious authorities is easy to 
understand since a family was extinguished and merged with 
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another. The adoptive family may have consisted of just 
the adrogatus or if he held a family in potestas they also 
merged with him. A provision might have had to be made for 
the continuation of the religious cult for the sake of the 
ancestors. Therefore,adrogation was of special interest 
to the pontiffs. 170 
There is no actual proof that adrogatio existed at 
the time of the XII Tables but it is assumed, for the use 
of comitia curiatia (which ceased to function in the eary 
republic) certainly indicates that adrogatio existed prior 
to the XII Tables.171 
The parties involved in the adrogation procedure 
were rogati and they were asked if they consented. Follow-
ing this was a rogatio of the populus which was probably 
followed by detestatio sacrorum - the renunciation by the 
adrogatus of the sacra of his old family. 172 If all went 
accordingly, an act was passed making the person adrogated 
a member of his new family and extinguishing the old family. 
Then the person adrogated passed into the potestas of the 
person adrogating and lost all his ancient religious rites 
(sacra). Adrogatio brought the adrogatus completely into 
the family. He became a filiusfamilias and brought both 
all those who had been under his potestas and all of his 
property. 
After the comitia· curiata lost its power, the citi-
zens were represented by thirty lictors. The judicial inqui-
ry was still held,and the consent of the parties was still 
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necessary. Diocletian changed the form so that all that was 
requisite was a rescript of the emporer which continued 
until Justinian. 173 
Rescriptiones 
There were certain restrictions placed on adrogatio: 
(i) since adrogatio destroyed a family, it was allowed o!'lly 
to save another family - i. e. to provide heres. Therefore, 
there was very careful investigation and legislative con-
sent. (ii) If the adrogation was done through the comitia, 
it had to occur at Rome where the comitia sat. It could 
be done anywhere by an imperial rescript after Diocletian's 
change. (iii) A woman could not be adrogated, having no 
standing before the comiti~but if the adrogation was per-
formed by an imperial rescript it was legal. However, the 
advantage was small; although she continued her family for her 
generation she had no heres. (iv) In early law an impubes 
could not be adrogated, for it placed an easily misused 
power in the hands of the tutores, for they would then have 
the means to avoid accounting for the administration of the 
ward's estate. Antoninus Pius allowed it in certain cases 
after a careful inquiry concerning the possible advantages 
to the child. The auctoritas of the tutor was required and 
the adrogator gave security that if the adrogatus died while 
still an impubes his property would be restored to those 
who would have had it had he not been adrogated. If the 
adrogatus was emancipated while still an impubes, the adrogator 
73 
had to restore the property immediately. If the adrogator 
disinherited the adrogatus, the adrogatus could claim his 
own property at the adrogator's death. If the adrogator 
had emancipated the adrogatus without revealing the reason 
to the court and later died, the adrogatus could claim one-
fourth of the adrogatus' estate (quarta antonina). This 
was what an only child could claim of a father's estate un-
less he had been justly disinherited. The liabilities were 
probably covered by the security given earlier. When the 
adrogatus reached puberty the securities and liabilities 
ended. However, the adrogatus could have the adrogatio set 
aside by a forced emancipatio - if he could show sufficient 
reason. 174 (v) Adrogation was used only as a last resort 
to save a familY, and a person could only adrogate once. (vi) 
A person in order to adrogate must be at least sixty years 
of age and unlikely to have children. (vii) One under 
twenty-five could not be adrogated by a former tutor or 
curator. All of these restrictions could be overridden if 
the reasons were justified. It lay in the discretion of the 
controlling authorities. An adrogatio which broke these 
l 'd 'f 11 . d 175 rules was va i i actua y carr1e out. 
Modi Adrogationis 
Some dispute exists as to when adrogation was first 
made per rescriptum principis. Ulpian says that by his time 
adrogation was made per populum (i. e. curies represented by 
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lictors) and not by imperial rescript. Ulpian further says 
adrogation could only occur at Rome, but when the use of 
. . 1 . . h 1 d"d 176 imperia rescript was introduced t e p ace i not matter. 
It is known that in the time of Justinian the Roman forms 
of adoptio were abolished and replaced by declarations re-
. d . h h" f . h . l" 177 gistere in t e arc ives o court in t e muncipa ity. 
Adoption by the rescript of the emperor insisted 
that a person having his own children not only gives himself 
in adrogation but also submits to the adrogator's control 
his own children. The children are then considered to be 
the grandchildren of the adrogator. For this reason Augus-
tus did not adopt Tiberius until Tiberius adopted Germanicus, 
and thus upon Tiberius adoption Germanicus became Augustus' 
grandson. 178 Adrogation also could be performed through a 
will. It was in this way that Julius Caesar adopted Augustus. 
Probably this method had to be approved by an act of the 
comitia curiata. 179 
Before Justinian all the property of the person ad-
rogated became the property of the adrogator, but Justinian 
changed it so the adrogator acquired only a life use of the 
property of the adrogatus. Originally the debts of the 
adrogatus were wiped out upon adrogation, but in Justinian's 
time the adrogator had.to pay the debts lest the creditors 
could claim the assets of the adrogatus. This was a protec-
tion for interested third parties. In some cases where the 
adrogator did not meet an action arising out of debts incurred 
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before adrogation,the praetor authorized a bonorum venditio 
(sale of adrogator's property in bulk) up to the amount of the 
adrogatus' original contribution plus any subsequent additions 
made through him. 180 
Similitudines Inter Adoptionem 
Et Adrogationem 
The similarities between adoption and adrogation are 
many, to mention a few: (i) Both the adoptee and adrogatus 
changed families although the prior status of each differed. 
The former was alieni juris while the later was sui juris. 
(ii) Both the adrogator and adopter had to be eighteen 
years of age. (iii) It was impossible for one to adopt 
or adrogate if castrated. (iv) In early law women could 
neither adopt nor adrogate since a woman was the end of the 
family. Later, however, a woman was allowed to adopt as a so-
lace for lost children. 
The institution of adoption and adrogation is a very 
complex one. Adoptions to a large extent were arranged for 
political or practical reasons. In most cases adoption prob-
ably lacked the emotional tie with which we are so accustomed. 
Because of its importance to the Roman people, they devised 
many ways to ensure benefits for all concerned; but as a re-
sult of these complex machinations, problems were inevitable. 
For example, for what reason would one adopt a person as a 
grandchild or great-grandchild rather than a child of the 
first degree of ascendancy, especially when there were no heirs 
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of the first degree? The obvious answer would seem to be 
for inheritance reasons - i. e. the one adopted or adrogated 
may inherit more by avoiding certain taxes as a result of not 
being of the first degree. 
Another perplexing problem was that in later Roman 
times women were allowed to adopt in a special circumstance 
i. e. as a solace for lost children. But why was this allow-
ed? The children did not enter the woman's potestas; the 
family ended with the woman. This seems to be of a disad-
vantage to the children unless they remained legally a part 
of their old family; or possibly they fell under the potestas 
of the adoptive paternal grandfather, although this is not 
indicated. 
One was allowed to adopt or adrogate and then in 
turn give the adoptive person or adrogatus to his own son in 
adoption. The reason this was allowed seems to be confusing. 
Possibly it was allowed because the son was in potestas 
of his own father; and, therefore, could not initiate an adoptive 
procedure on his own behalf. 
There are many suppositions one could suggest as 
to the why's of Roman adoptive procedures. There are many 
unanswered questions and many blanks and fragments as a 
result of little primary information. Gaius and Justinian 
are of immeasurable importanc~ but much of their writing 
has been interpolated and revised so that it would be rel-
evant for their day. It is regrettable that there occurs a 
77 
lack of primary information in such an area that affects us 
greatly - for much of our own legal system is influenced by 
Roman law. 
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